According to a famous fable [1] , one night, a drunk man was looking for his lost keys under a streetlight. As it turned out, he had lost them somewhere far away. When asked why he didn't go back to where he had lost the keys to look, he replied, ''but the light is here!'' Of course, seeing things clearly is easier in some places than it is in others, and in looking for the neural mechanisms for consciousness in the brain, there may be similar temptations. Specifically, neural coding is relatively straightforward and extremely sparse [2] in sensory areas. Such coding can be roughly understood as having a 'labeled lines' architecture [3] , where the representational content of individual neurons is described in terms of receptive field locations and specific features. This is in contrast to the prefrontal cortex (PFC), where neurons show a high degree of mixed selectivity [4] , such that identifying perceptual content has proved to be more challenging. As such, despite ample evidence that PFC activity underlies subjective judgments in perceptual tasks [5, 6] , the causal status of PFC activity for consciousness is debated [7, 8] .
One point of debate concerns the observation that the link between PFC activity and consciousness is weakened when subjects do not have to attend to and report about the relevant stimuli. Specifically, under these conditions, PFC signals reflecting the difference between conscious and unconscious perception are typically reduced, especially for conventional neuroimaging measurements [6] . As such, it may look as if these signals were primarily driven by report and attention. However, PFC activity isn't entirely abolished when attention and explicit reports are omitted; using more sensitive invasive multiunit neuronal recordings, it has been shown that unreported and unattended stimulus features can be read out from PFC , nearly as well as for reported and attended features [4] . Similar decoding approaches can be applied to neuroimaging data [9] . Yet, if one focuses on traditional univariate analyses for neuroimaging data, indeed it might seem like the bright streetlights are not there in PFC.
A second point of contention is that, if PFC is truly critical for conscious experiences, one may expect lesion to this region to affect some specific aspects of subjective perception. Indeed, a group study of patients with mostly unilateral PFC lesions showed a 50% decrease in their ability to correctly introspect perceptual (but not memory) content [10] . As in careful psychophysics studies, such effects were observed using nearthreshold, i.e., degraded, visual stimuli. However, some have argued that these near-threshold situations are ''virtually irrelevant'' from the perspective of everyday conscious perception [11] . It is not clear to what extent such arguments are meant to write off the meaningfulness of psychophysics for conscious perception in general. But the point may be that again, to some, the streetlights are not there in PFC.
The sensitivity of near-threshold methods may be needed, however, because unilateral PFC lesions in humans often do not always lead to the complete abolishment of functions, including 'textbook' PFC functions such as working memory [12] . On the other hand, complete bilateral lesions are rare and often misidentified [8] . For complex systems like the brain (and maybe PFC in particular), the traditional logic of using unilateral lesion methods to demonstrate absolute necessity for functions may therefore not be as straightforward as was once thought [13] ; relatively clear cases like Broca's area seem to be exceptions rather than the norm.
An analogy may help to illustrate this point. Suppose one builds a computational neural network using current artificial intelligence methods, with the goal of generating sentences to describe some pictures ( Figure 1 ). Lesioning different parts of this network may lead to different levels of impairment; some lesions may afford higher degrees of 'graceful degradation' or fault tolerance [14] than others. It should be clear that using such information to identify the functions of different subparts of the network may therefore be misleading. This is of course not to say that the network in Figure 1 would be a precise model of the brain, but we can gain important intuitions by thinking of PFC as playing similar roles as the nodes at the higher levels. Even neglecting feedback from high to lower layers, which is known to be important in conscious mammalian brains, one can see that nodes at all levels contribute causally to overall function despite the varying effects of lesions. Ignoring the network structure and focusing on the lesion alone may therefore misleadingly suggest that the recurrent layer is causally irrelevant.
Likewise, this can help us understand why traditional methods of PFC electrical stimulation may not drastically modify conscious experiences (though such rare cases have been reported, e.g., [15, 16] ). Stimulating nodes from some deeper or late stage layer may have a relatively small and non-specific impact on the output content due to the relatively complex connections, but this does not mean these nodes are 'content free'. Continuing the same analogy that PFC coding may be more like what happens in higher layers, this may also explain why PFC may misleadingly look like relatively unlit territory as we search for the keys to consciousness.
Admittedly, an analogy is not proof. Thankfully, as reported in this issue of Current Biology, Pal et al. [17] shed some much needed empirical light on the role of this brain region in consciousness by using pharmacological stimulation that likely impacts PFC activity more broadly than focal lesions or electrical stimulations. They exposed rats to continuous sevoflurane anesthesia and tested whether perfusion of a cholinergic or noradrenergic agonist to either PFC or one of two parietal targets (posterior parietal cortex or medial parietal association cortex) could reverse anesthesia. While in all cases drug perfusion produced electroencephalographic signs of arousal Two neural networks are designed to describe images in words. In each network, the first three layers constitute a feedforward architecture that crudely reflects the structure of a mammalian visual system. The fourth layer is a recurrent neural network, which somewhat mimics the highly recurrently connected nature of frontal and parietal cortices. Network 1 (left) contains a 'lesion' to the upper left quadrant of the input layer (red; extent of lesion as it corresponds to the input image is shown by the dotted lines). Because the lesion occurs at the input level, a quarter of the information in the image is irrevocably lost. The network thus makes the error of identifying the tree on the left side of the image as a stump. Network 2 (right) contains a lesion to the upper left quadrant of the recurrent layer. Image information in the feedforward network is preserved, and because the non-lesioned nodes in the recurrent layer are so highly interconnected, processing at this level may show limited impairment, which may be overcome with additional training. This well-known phenomenon of 'graceful degradation' may thus give the false impression that higher layers are not causally relevant.
R750 Current Biology 28, R737-R759, July 9, 2018 Current Biology Dispatches and increased respiration rate, only cholinergic stimulation of PFC produced clear behavioral signs of wakefulness. Their results provide strong evidence for the causal involvement of PFC in consciousness. Hopefully, even to those who are skeptical of near-threshold perceptual effects, the importance of restoring consciousness from anesthesia cannot be denied lightly.
Of course, one caveat of this interpretation is that it elides the important difference between states of consciousness, i.e., wakefulness versus being 'knocked out', and the specific content of subjective experiences, e.g., the redness of a tomato versus the greenness of its vine. But perhaps, because of some partially shared mechanisms, the two notions of consciousness are intimately linked; after all, supposedly one rarely experiences vivid perceptual contents when adequately anesthetized.
One network-based view for such potentially shared mechanisms is the mesocircuit model of consciousness [18] , which accounts for the results of several studies in which patients with disorders of consciousness showed signs of recovery following various types of mechanical or pharmacological stimulation (Figure 2 ).
In the context of this model, the details regarding the local acetylcholine (Ach) levels measured in each condition by Pal et al. [17] become intriguing. Specifically, cholinergic stimulation of PFC via the agonist carbachol was unique in causing roughly a 500% increase in local Ach levels. By comparison, in all other conditions, group level increases in local acetylcholine ranged from about 20% to 75%. A possible explanation for this large difference is based on the idea that the basal forebrain, which contains the brain's major cholinergic output system, receives afferent inputs from PFC, but not parietal cortex [19] (Figure 2 ). Given this known connectivity profile, perhaps within their experimental setup, only stimulation of PFC could generate largescale cholinergic activation (via the pink cholinergic efferents shown in Figure 2 ) of the three major excitatory nodes of the classic mesocircuit (frontal cortex, parietal cortex, and thalamus). This could consequently lead to strong positive excitatory feedback within the mesocircuit, which would explain the wakefulness behavior that was observed in response to stimulation of PFC, but not parietal cortex.
If this interpretation is right, it may further imply that PFC signals to the basal forebrain are more strongly activated by cholinergic as opposed to noradrenergic stimulation. Speculatively, this model would also suggest that cholinergic stimulation of PFC, implemented via reverse dialysis of carbachol as in Pal et al. [17] , might have also resulted in larger increases in parietal Ach levels than direct cholinergic stimulation of parietal cortex itself. If this were true, parietal cholinergic activity may not be causally irrelevant; it may just be easier to trigger such activity via PFC than via direct parietal stimulation.
Of course, as keys are not always found automatically as we shine light on the ground, the experiments of Pal et al. [17] understandably do not on their own tell us the full answer to the age old problem of consciousness. But if the above analysis is correct, then we should not write off the causal contribution of parietal cortex just yet, just as other researchers should not write off the role of PFC in consciousness based on the sheer lack of ease of observation. While Pal et al.'s [17] results and experimental setup do not allow us to fully address all of the above hypotheses and questions, they certainly serve to motivate further studies. In sobriety, let us recognize the need for more resources and effort, to take us into these new and exciting areas that were once considered to be 'in the dark'. Figure 2 . A modified schematic of the 'mesocircuit' that is proposed to underlie recovery of consciousness in several stimulation studies (see [18] ).
Frontal cortex is a critical node, receiving excitatory inputs from the thalamus and parietal cortex while sending excitatory projections to the medium spiny neurons (MSN) of the striatum, consequently disinhibiting the thalamus via inhibitory projections from the globus pallidus interna. The classic mesocircuit is modified here to show excitatory projections from frontal cortex to the basal forebrain [19] (though see also [20] , which highlights potentially complex inhibitory pathways too), a global cholinergic output system. Importantly, cholinergic efferents from the basal forebrain (pink) target each of the major excitatory nodes of the classic mesocircuit (thalamus, frontal cortex, and parietal cortex). Thus, through its direct connections to the basal forebrain, frontal cortex may be uniquely positioned to initiate large scale excitation of the mesocircuit.
